Realism tells us that individual- and state-level factors--e.g., the interests of major economic actors, the perceptions and cognitive processes of individual political leaders--are largely irrelevant to understanding signifcant foreign policy decisions. This short interview with Dick Cheney, however, gives us an indication of the limits of realism. Cheney's analysis of the reasons against removing Saddam Hussein from power after the first Guf War are a textbook example of realist logic: the US had no compelling national interest in removing a dangerous dictator largely because the strategic costs of doing so outweighed the benefits. That is, without support from Arab allies, without a reliable method of maintaining stability in the region and political coherence within Iraq (which would lead to bigger problems), and so on, it simply made no "strategic" sense for the US to go further. Of course, in 2003 (and even before), Cheney's tune changed completely. Yet, and this is the important point, the strategic environment of decision-making remained largely the same. In 2003, there was still no support from Arab or Islamic allies, there was still no viable political alternative to the Baathist regime, and there was even less support from the international community at large, including the UN and major powers (France, Russia and China). As we know now, too, there was no imminent danger from the Hussein regime itself--that is, there were no weapons of mass destruction. (Indeed, even if Hussein had WMDs, from a strict realist perspective, this would not have mattered since Hussein could not have used the weapons against the US without fear of total obliteration--a point that Condoleezza Rice made quite clearly when she, too, was still espousing realist principles.)
Despite all this, the United States launched a "pre-emptive" invasion to remove Hussein from power. It is clear, to repeat, that the international strategic environment did not necessitate this action, as realism claims. Instead, the key motivating factors almost certainly had to be domestic in nature. Whether these were economic/class interests or products of individual needs, interests or perception is, of course, important. But, the larger theoretical point is simply that realism cannot adequately explain this extraordinary foreign policy decision. To put it bluntly, this is a major flaw in the realist framework, and one that students of international relations cannot afford to ignore.
