Hard Times Ahead for CSUs

The recently approved budget is going to result is some very hard times for the CSU and for CSLA specifically. Already, dozens if not hundreds of course sections are being cut throughout the university, lecturers are being effectively laid off, fees are being increased, and thousands of students will find that they will not be able to enroll in courses they need to graduate (for example, the POLS department is cutting both of its upper division theme courses). Students who already take 5, 6 or seven years to graduate, may find that it takes even longer from now on. What is the solution? The easiest one, of course, is for California's overall economy to improve: as the economy improves funding will likely, although not necessarily, be restored to previous levels. But, here's the rub: the boom and bust cycles are almost certain to repeat, and for every "bust" the situation for the CSUs (and UCs) gets worse.

The longer term solution must be a more stable source of funding for the system of higher education in the state. The California Faculty Association has proposed on solution--California AB 655, which will impose a tax on the oil extracted from California and devote the associated revenue to the state's three public higher educations systems. I do not how viable this proposal is, either politically or economically, but creative solutions are definitely needed. The consequence of doing nothing is the inevitable decline and decimation of public higher education in California, which in turn, will have far reaching repercussions for the state.

Who is Korean? Migration, Immigration, and the Challenge of Multiculturalism in Homogeneous Societies

“I don’t know,” opines a 31-year old Korean woman. “I have always believed that Korea is a single-race country. And I’m proud of that. Somehow, Korea becoming a multiracial society doesn’t sound right.” This is not an unusual view. Indeed, the large majority of Koreans would likely agree that Korean society is inextricably tied to and defined by a unique Korean identity, one based on an uncompromising conflation of race and ethnicity. The strong tendency among Koreans to conflate race and ethnicity has important implications, the most salient of which is this: it has served to create an exceptionally rigid and narrow conceptualization of national identity and belongingness. To be “truly” Korean, one must not only have Korean blood, but must also embody the values, the mores, and the mind-set of Korean society. This helps explain why overseas Koreans (from China, Russia, Japan, the United States and other countries throughout the world) have not fit into Korean society as Koreans. They are different, “real” Koreans recognize, despite sharing the same blood. At the same time, those who lack a “pure blood” relationship, no matter how acculturated they may be, have also been rejected as outsiders. This rejection, more importantly, has generally led to severe forms of discrimination.

This is arguably most apparent with “Amerasians,” who, in South Korea, are primarily children born to a Korean woman and an American man, usually a U.S. soldier. It is important to note here that it was only in 1998 that non-Korean husbands gained legal rights to naturalize, while non-Korean wives have long had this right. At the same time, up until 1994, most “international marriages” in Korea were between a foreign man and Korean woman. According to the ethno-racial and patrilineal logic of belongingness in South Korea, then, Amerasians have been viewed as decidedly non-Korean interlopers who belong, if anywhere, in the land of their fathers. The ill treatment of Amerasians was, as Mary Lee and others have argued, exacerbated by a patriarchal and hyper-masculine sense of national identity: Amerasian children were associated with the “shame” and “humiliation” of a dominant Western power conquering and abusing Korean women for sexual pleasure. Not surprisingly, then, Amerasians have been ostracized from mainstream Korean society; they were not only subject to intense and pervasive interpersonal and social abuse, but also to institutional discrimination—Amerasian males, for example, were barred from serving in the South Korean military, which is mandatory for every other Korean male and is “an institutional rite of passage which enables access to citizen rights” (emphasis added) (This law was revised in 2006 so that “mixed-blood” Koreans could voluntarily enlist for military service.) In concrete terms, the discriminatory treatment of Amerasians has resulted in unusually high school drop out rates (and much lower levels of educational achievement overall), significantly higher rates of unemployment and underemployment, and much lower pay.

This is a full-length article. The rest can be viewed online on Japan Focus.

Why California is Not too Big to Fail

California is big, very big. If it were a separate country, it would be one of the largest economies in the world: somewhere between the 8th and 10th largest, depending on the year and source you look at. In 2007, California’s gross state product was $1.812 trillion, number one in the country. In terms of population, California is the largest state in the U.S. with about 38 million people, or about one-eighth of total U.S. population. California is also a pretty large employer: in 2009, the state had, on its direct payroll, 244,061 active employees. By these measures, California is certainly “bigger” than, say, AIG, which has received something like $173 billion in US taxpayer money. Hundreds of other banks, insurers and even a few manufacturers (all much smaller than California) have received bailout funds as well, ranging from a few million dollars to tens of billions of dollars. Despite California’s immense size, however, there is almost no prospect that it will receive federal “bailout” funds to help it out of its current budget mess—a deficit that exceeds $26 billion (really, pocket change in light of the amount of money AIG has received).

All of this raises the obvious question, “Is California too big to fail?” This is a question many pundits have also asked and answered: most answer that California, in fact, is not too big to fail. I think they are right, but they are asking the wrong question. The right question should focus more on the “power” of California as a state. And, as an economic and political actor, California has precious little power. It is important at this point, however, to take a small step back. When I speak of “power” I do not mean the power that comes from just being big. Indeed, that’s a small aspect of power, especially from the standpoint of political economy. Instead, when I speak of power, I’m borrowing from the ideas of Susan Strange, who talked about structural power and, more specifically, four dimensions of structural power: security, production, finance, and knowledge. I don’t have time to discuss all these dimensions here (to learn more, take my POLS/ECON 426 course), so let me just say that in terms of structural power, California is quite small.

As an economic and political actor, for example, California doesn’t have much productive power in its own right: “California” doesn’t produce things in the way that Chrysler or GM do (two economic actors that received bailouts); rather, it’s the companies that are based in California that produce things. Similarly, while banks and large financial institutions have power because they control “credit” (the lifeblood of an economy), California’s financial power is very limited. The state does provide security, which is why police, prison system, and the courts are much more protected than other players in the state, but this isn’t enough to protect the budget as a whole. Finally, the state does have a university system, which produces “knowledge,” and this is not unimportant: but “knowledge” comes from a wide variety of sources, both inside and outside of California, so even here the state is a relatively small player.

Without structural power, the state is basically at the mercy of larger forces. This is why California is not too big to fail.