Obama: The First Asian-American President

Back in July 2008, Jeff Yang wrote a column titled, "Could Obama be the first Asian American president?" Yang, of course, was building from the well worked notion of Clinton as the first Black president. As Toni Morrison put it in 1998:

White skin notwithstanding, this [Clinton] is our first black president. Blacker than any actual black person who could ever be elected in our children's lifetime. After all, he displays almost every trope of blackness: single-parent household, born poor, working-class, saxophone-playing, McDonald's-and-junk-food-loving boy from Arkansas.

The jist of Morrison's argument (and of Yang's as well), is that racial or ethnic identity is not determined solely (or even mostly) by skin color or some other genetic characteristic, but instead is cultural. There is, moreover, a clear implication in this view: cultural values influence our outlook, attitudes, and behavior. From this perspective, Obama almost certainly is our first Asian-American president. This is not to say, I should emphasize, that Obama's other identities--African-

American, multiracial, American, and so on--are less important or less valid, for we all have multiple identities. But it is to say that Obama, in a very meaningful and even profound way, represents Asian-Americans.

From a practical political perspective, this means he recognizes that Asian-Americans are an integral part of the United States. This is reflected in his refusal to treat Asian Americans as mere tokens in his administration. Indeed, he is the first president to nominate more than a single Asian-American to a cabinet post. To date, in fact, he has nominated three: Eric Shinseki for Secretary of Veteran Affairs, Steven Chu for Secretary of Energy, and, most recently, Gary Locke for Secretary of Commerce. In addition, the most senior members of his congressional team (when he was still serving as a senator) are Asian-American: his Senate chief of staff was Pete Rouse, whose mother is Japanese American, and his legislative director was Chris Lu, whose parents come from China (Lu is now Cabinet Secretary and Rouse is now a Senior Adviser).

Most likely, Obama did not necessarily "see" these individuals as Asian-Americans; but, this too, is part of the point: until Obama, Asian Americans, no matter how qualified, were largely invisible. They no longer are.

Addendum: Obama's recent nomination of Harold Hongju Koh as the State Department's top legal advisor continues the president's pattern of recognizing Asian-Americans.

States or Markets? The Problem with Binary Thinking

While teaching International Political Economy this quarter (after a rather long hiatus) and watching John Stossel's interview of Arriana Huffington last night on ABC's 20/20, it struck me how binary thinking really does make otherwise intelligent people “stupid.” Stossel, who I've written about before, is similar to many pundits: he sees the world in stark black- and-white, binary or dichotomous terms. In particular, to Stossel and others, if the government is not the solution (and to Stossel, it's clearly not the solution) it must be the problem. There's no middle ground, no room for a more nuanced understanding of the role that governments (or states) must play in the modern world. It is not surprising, then, that Stossel extols the virtues of the market: without exaggeration, he believes that only the market (or, perhaps more accurately, the logic of the market) can solve the most pressing problems of modern society. If the educational system is “broken,” it must be the government's fault and only market-based competition can fix it. If the welfare system doesn't work, again, it's the government's fault and the only solution is to subject “welfare recipients” to the efficient winds of market forces.

What Stossel and others of his ilk fail to see, however, is that modern states and markets exist in a mutually dependent, even co-dependent relationship. State power, at the most general level, allows markets to function (consider what would happen if there was no political authority capable of enforcing private property rights and contracts). Even more, states are often necessary to create and maintain “free” markets: consider what might happen if companies had no restraint on their exercise of their power. Many, if they could, would do everything possible to eliminate-permanently-their rivals (even Adam Smith believed this) to snuff out competition so they could reap monopolistic profits. In an era of mega-corporations, which can figuratively reach around the world, only states can stand in their way. In a world populated by other states, moreover, no private actor would be able to create and sustain a framework of international or global free trade.

Once we recognize that states are part-and-parcel of the capitalist process, it becomes harder to sustain the argument that they are, as Stossel implies, antithetical to markets and competition. And, if one cannot sustain that argument, then the related argument that state action and power is the problem begins to crumble.

It is also important to understand that states, at least in principle, operate according to a different logic than firms, and that this difference is something we all want. Capitalist firms, by definition, are motivated by profit. The profit motive is important and it leads to tremendous economic results, of this there is no doubt. A (democratic) state, however, is ostensibly motivated by a much broader set of goals: a state must ensure the survival and security of the country (both internal and external), it must be concerned with issues of equity, justice, and, indeed, social welfare (broadly defined), and it must be concerned with creating and maintaining public goods (a livable environment, clean water, transportation systems, etc.). (An aside: Marxists are less sanguine about the motivations of states; they believe that states represent the interests of capital to begin with. This is worthwhile position to explore, as I do in my classes, but for the sake of argument, let us assume that states can also act in the interest of the population at large.)

We know that capitalism, even or especially when it is operating smoothly, produces unemployment and poverty and all sorts of socially destructive results-at least in the short-run. Market actors have no incentive to protect workers and others since doing so undermines their profits. This is perhaps the best reason we don't want “national defense” privatized: it's really an oxymoron, since “privatization” implies exclusive (i.e., private) interests, while “national” implies collective interests. Really, does Stossel believe that we should turn over national defense to Blackwater?

Herein lies another useful point: The American state (or government) is very good, very effective at providing national defense. We hear time and time again, that the U.S. has the best military in the world. Yet, it is a monopoly (i.e. no actor, private or otherwise, can compete against the U.S. government in providing military defense). Yet, according to Stossel, state-based monopolies never work. Now, I can already hear Stossel and others saying, “Yes, but the U.S. government relies on private enterprise to provide defense, and there is competition among private firms to manufacturer weapons.” Fair enough. But this makes my point: as in many, many areas, governments and private enterprise (the logic of the state and the logic of the market) go hand-in-hand. They are not binary opposites, but mutually reinforcing.

This is not, I should emphasize, meant to be a paean to the state (I am, in fact, skeptical of both the state and market). Rather, I simply want to make the point that binary, either-or thinking leads to simplistic, even dangerous conclusions.

Cheney and the Limits of Realism

Realism tells us that individual- and state-level factors--e.g., the interests of major economic actors, the perceptions and cognitive processes of individual political leaders--are largely irrelevant to understanding signifcant foreign policy decisions. This short interview with Dick Cheney, however, gives us an indication of the limits of realism. Cheney's analysis of the reasons against removing Saddam Hussein from power after the first Guf War are a textbook example of realist logic: the US had no compelling national interest in removing a dangerous dictator largely because the strategic costs of doing so outweighed the benefits. That is, without support from Arab allies, without a reliable method of maintaining stability in the region and political coherence within Iraq (which would lead to bigger problems), and so on, it simply made no "strategic" sense for the US to go further. Of course, in 2003 (and even before), Cheney's tune changed completely. Yet, and this is the important point, the strategic environment of decision-making remained largely the same. In 2003, there was still no support from Arab or Islamic allies, there was still no viable political alternative to the Baathist regime, and there was even less support from the international community at large, including the UN and major powers (France, Russia and China). As we know now, too, there was no imminent danger from the Hussein regime itself--that is, there were no weapons of mass destruction. (Indeed, even if Hussein had WMDs, from a strict realist perspective, this would not have mattered since Hussein could not have used the weapons against the US without fear of total obliteration--a point that Condoleezza Rice made quite clearly when she, too, was still espousing realist principles.)

Despite all this, the United States launched a "pre-emptive" invasion to remove Hussein from power. It is clear, to repeat, that the international strategic environment did not necessitate this action, as realism claims. Instead, the key motivating factors almost certainly had to be domestic in nature. Whether these were economic/class interests or products of individual needs, interests or perception is, of course, important. But, the larger theoretical point is simply that realism cannot adequately explain this extraordinary foreign policy decision. To put it bluntly, this is a major flaw in the realist framework, and one that students of international relations cannot afford to ignore.

Imagine there's no Heaven

It's easy if you try

No hell below us

Above us only sky

Imagine all the people

Living for today

Imagine there's no countries

It isn't hard to do

Nothing to kill or die for

And no religion too

Imagine all the people

Living life in peace.

John Lennon's "Imagine" (1971), while immensely popular, is considered idealistic at best; indeed, even people who embrace the message of "Imagine" may think that it is naively utopian. Certainly, when one looks at the hard "reality" of the world we live in--especially the international world--it's not hard to concur. From a different perspective, however, Lennon's "utopianism" reflects the very simple belief that "ideas" matter--that ideas can and do have a profound impact on the world in which we live. Surprisingly, perhaps, this is a belief shared by many hard-headed, no-nonsense neo-conservatives. Neo-conservatives, however, believe that only hard power can be used to reshape reality--a point I discuss in my entry on the Bush Administration's View of Reality" below.

But Lennon, too, is talking about power: he is talking about the power of millions, tens of millions, even hundreds of millions of people imagining a more peaceful world. Imaginiing a world in which international borders and religious cleavages did not exist. Can such thing simply be wished away? Well, probably not. But one point is that international borders and religions are, in essence, little more than ideas. Yes, it is true that borders have an objective existence, yet the significance we attach to borders exists within our heads. That is, borders have meaning through the ideas of nationalism or citizenship. Certainly, this is even clearer in the case of religion: religion is simply a set of beliefs and values that exists within our collective heads. To change the world, then, requires changing our ideas about how the world should work or how it should be organized.

On this point, it worth remembering that democracy and individual freedom are ideas. The Bush administration believes, we are told, deeply in the idea and power of democracy. The Bush administration believes that spreading democracy will bring a fundamental change to international relations, and in particular, will bring peace to the Middle East. Is Bush a utopian? Perhaps. But, if he is, he has a lot of company.

The issue, needless to say, is much, much more complex than what I presented here. Suffice it to say, then, that we--as students of political science--need to consider seriously the significance of ideas in the "real world." Do ideas have power? If so, how is this power manifested and under what conditions? Can ideas--shared among whole populations--reshape the world in a fundamental way? I am not offering an answer here, only an "idea" to ponder.

Bush and Reality

A few years back an unnamed Bush official told reporter Ron Suskind, "We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality--judiciously, as you will--we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors...and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do." Now, I know it's a bit late to be commenting on this statement (first reported in 2005), but I was reminded of it when I heard and wrote about Ann Coulter's quote, "I'm more of a man than any liberal." Ironically, both quotes reflect a post modernist or reflectivist perspective, which understands reality as socially constructed. I say ironically because most conservatives see post modernism as mushy, leftist thinking associated with such strange foreigners (even worse, Frenchmen!) as Foucault, Derrida, and Lyotard.

Yet, from a post modern or reflectivist perspective, the idea that powerful governments--even more, hegemonic powers--create their own realities is not at all far-fetched. Indeed, in many respects, this is the starting point of analysis, a fundamental assumption. Certaiinly, as we look at the what the Bush administration has done--and what it is doing--it is not difficult to conclude that it is creating and recreating realities, some of which, to be sure, are very tenuous. (But, in a post modern world, we have to accept the "truth" that reality is not a fixed, objective fact.) Today, for example, the new reality is that we live in an inherently dangerous world populated by irrational terrorists who "hate freedom." In this reality, we have to fight the terrorists "over there" so that they cannot bring death and destruction "here." In this new reality, moreover, the United States is largely, if not entirely, an innocent target; the US--even as an empire--is certainly not responsible for creating the conditions that breed terrorists and terrorism. Of course, not everyone accepts this reality, but perhaps this is because the power of the American empire is under seige.

In sum, the idea that the Bush administration has the literal capacity to reshape reality should not be dismissed out of hand. For critics of the Bush administration, too, it is a lesson to take to heart. For while the present administration is not producing a more peaceful, more socially just world, one could argue that it possesses capaciity to do so. Social constructivists (such as Alexander Wendt), in fact, would argue that powerful states--especially acting under the influence of a hegemonic power--can, through their actions and understanding, construct a peaceful world order.

Ann Coulter: A Post-Modern Feminist?

In an interview with Bill O'Reilly, Ann Coulter pronounced, "I'm more of a man than any liberal." Now, I'm sure Coulter would be the last women in the world to claim allegiance to feminist post-modernism, but her pithy statement reflects beautifully a key concept in post-modernist thought. This thought is the idea that gender is a socially constructed concept. What this means, in more simple terms, is that what we think of as "masculine" and "feminine"--as male and female--has as much do with societal norms and values as it does with supposedly fixed biological categories. Ann Coulter is "more of man than any liberal" because, supposedly, she personifies masculine traits: she's aggessive, tough, rational, and so on. She is telling us that women who embrace such traits are, for all intents and purposes, men. On the other hand, men who adopt supposedly feminine traits cease being "true men" and become something else, something less than men.

Note, though, a clear implication of Coulter's statement, which is that maleness is "naturally" superior to femaleness, that feminine traits are essentially undesirable and inferior. So, Coulter, after all, isn't a feminist, nor is she a post-modernist. For she essentializes "maleness": she tells us that maleness can only be defined, understood or interpreted as a binary opposition to femaleness and, that by definition, maleness is superior to femaleness, at least in the world of politics.

Photo blog: The Migrant Workers' Hospital and Foreign Migrant Workers' House

September 27, 2006 • The Migrant Workers' Hospital (MWH) and Foreign Migrant Workers' House are two of many organizations set up to assist foreign migrant workers in Korea. The MWH, however, is the first and only hospital established specifically to treat foreign workers. It is the product of a great deal of hard work and dedication on the part of Rev. Kim Hae-sung. Rev. Kim was kind enough to sit for an extended interview with me; he also provided a tour of his facilities and encouraged me to take many pictures. I am reproducing some of the photos via an online photo album. Click on the link to see the pictures.

Migrant Workers' Hospital and Migrant Workers' House, September 27, 2006 - 28 Photos

An Interview with Shakil (Migrants' Trade Union, South Korea)

The Migrants' Trade Union (MTU) is a small, but important development in the evolution of international migration in South Korea. It represents an effort by foreign migrant workers--primarily from Bangladesh and Nepal--to establish their own political voice in South Korea. The union is headed by Anwar Hossein. Hossein, however, was violently arrested by Korean immigration authorities on May 14th, 2005, and incarcerated in the Chungjoo detention centre (south of Seoul). He was held for almost a year, but was recently transferred to a hospital due to ill-health. This is most likely a "face-saving" tactic, which will allow immigration authorities to release Anwar for "humanitarian reasons." During his detention, the MTU's vice president, Shakil, was the acting president of the union. The following text is a translation of an interview I had with Shakil on May 22, 2006.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER. This is not a verbatim interview. The interview was conducted in Korean and with an interpreter. The "quotes" below, therefore, reflect not only a (rough) translation, but also my personal effort to create a smooth and coherent response in English. (My notes, in other words, were very choppy, so I edited them before reproducing here.) I have endeavored, however, to reflect the clear intent of Shakil in everything reproduced below.


When and why did you first come to Korea?

I came to Korea in 1992 on a tourist visa. Initially, though, didn't intend to stay in Korea; I was interested in going to another country, such as Japan. I saw Korea basically as a stepping-stone. When I came to Korea I initially wanted to establish my own business, buying Korean goods and then selling them to buyers in Bangladesh. This didn’t work out, so eventually I had to find work, but the only work available was low-skilled work in factories.

How long have you been in Korea?

For 14 years, since 1992.

How long do you plan to stay?

I don’t know. Personally, I don’t want to stay in Korea. Life is very hard in Korea as an undocumented worker. Living in Korea is very stressful and frustrating. I was arrested once in 2000, but I was released. This was because I was injured at the time. I have not left, however, because I feel a responsibility to the MTU. I will leave when the union achieves its major objectives.What was your life like in the first few years?My first job was in Incheon at a company that manufactured public phones. I worked there for three years. After three years, though, my visa expired for good—I was able get four 6-month renewals, but since then I have been in Korea without a valid visa. After that point, I moved frequently between jobs to avoid getting caught by immigration authorities.

Do you have family or children in Korea?

I’m not married, and I have no family in Korea. My mother and father live in Bangladesh, but I haven’t been back since I came to Korea. My mother died in 2005, but I wasn’t able to go back. If I had, it would have been nearly impossible to return to Korea.

What got you involved in political activities?

Originally, I didn’t have any intention to get involved in politics or in union activities. When I moved to Ansan, however, I was injured and went to the JCMK [Joint Committee for Migrant Workers in Korea] for assistance. This was in 1998. I was grateful for the help, and, in 1999, I started working as a volunteer counselor for the JCMK. Before that, though, I was familiar with the activities of the JCMK. In 1995, when 13 foreign workers from Nepal staged a sit-in at Myongdong Cathedral, some Korean NGOs helped the workers.

This was where the JCMK started. The Nepali workers, who were all trainees, demanded worker accident insurance. All were suffering from injuries and had been unable to receive treatment. They thought they might be able to get help--or at least bring some attention to their suffering--through a public protest. Although their protest wasn’t entirely successful, the government did respond. It was at this time that I realized there was a need for migrant workers to be organized—although not necessarily to achieve political goals per se. At the time, I was content to work through organizations such as the JCMK. By 2000, however, I realized that we--foreign migrant workers--needed our own organization, so we organized a “headquarters” for a struggle against government crackdowns and the trainee system.

BACKGROUND OF THE MIGRANTS' TRADE UNION

How/when did the union begin?

The union began from the “headquarters” originally formed in 2000. In May 2001, however, we joined the Equality Trade Union, and formed the Migrant Workers Branch. So the first migrant workers' union was called the "ETU-MB." The ETU-MB had four chapters: Seoul/Gyeonggi/Incheon, Ansan, Maseok, and (a separate) Incheon. Our new organization was still primarily focused on the same issues as earlier, but this was also the time the government began to consider creating the employment permit system.The situation was changing, so our focus also began to change. Another big event happened when the government announced a deadline for all illegal workers to leave Korea. The announcement was made on November 14, 2003. After this announcement, the ETU-MB, the Nepalese Struggle Alliance, and Korean Human Rights Center/Incheon joined together in a sit-in protest. The protest lasted for more than 1 year. The joseonjok were also demonstrating, although their protests were separate from ours. However, we all demanded the same thing: a stop to the crackdown on illegal workers; we also demanded that all undocumented workers be legalized and that the training system be abolished. This was a very intense period—14 foreign workers committed suicide.

We didn’t succeed. Still, it was a very fruitful experience in other ways. One of the primary benefits was that the demonstration dramatically increased public awareness of migrant workers and of foreign worker issues. After the protest, too, we realized that we needed a more formal organizational structure. Hitherto, the ETU-MB was divided into four geographic areas: north Gyeonggi, south Gyeonggi, Seoul, and Incheon. We thought that we needed to find a way to create a more cohesive organization, so we created a planning committee with representatives from the four chapters, plus one representative from the Nepalese Struggle Alliance, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, and the Equality Trade Union. Altogether, we had seven representatives on the planning committee. The planning committee was particularly concerned with membership, which had shrunk drastically after the long struggle against the government: prior to the beginning of the struggle, the ETU-MB had between 400 to 500 members, but afterwards there were only about 100 or so. Many of our members had been arrested and deported. One of the objectives of the planning committee was to expand membership by creating smaller chapters in specific areas, including: Ansan, Anyang, Osan, Songsu, Tongdaemun, Uijongbu, Suwon, and Incheon.

On April 24, 2005, the MTU was finally established.

What is the current membership (number)? Has membership been growing?

In April 2005 we had only about 91 members. Today (in 2006), we have about 300 members. So membership is increasing, but only ver slowly.

From which countries do the members come from?

Most of the members are from Bangladesh and Nepal. There’s about an even split between these two groups. Of the remaining 100 or so members, there are workers from Sri Lanka, Burma (Myanmar), Indonesia, and the Philippines.

Are the members all “illegal” or undocumented workers?

Prior to the crackdown in 2004, many of our members were legal. After that, though, almost our entire membership is undocumented. Probably less than 10 percent of our members are working in Korea legally.

What are the long-term plans of the union?

We are still concerned with government crackdowns on illegal workers, but our longer term goals are to expand the MTU into a national union, and, in conjunction with Democratic Labor Party, to reform the Employment Permit System. Instead, we want to establish a “Worker Permit System.”

RELATIONSHIP WITH KOREAN ORGANIZATIONS

Does the union have support of Korean unions?

Yes. We have had strong support from Korean labor unions, especially the KCTU. In fact, we are an official member of the “Seoul Council” and the “Gyeonggi Council” of the KCTU.

What is the nature of this support? Financial? Organizational?

The KCTU provides a great deal of organizational support, and is currently assisting us in our efforts to create a national union. If we succeed in this regard, then we can become a full member of the KCTU. The KCTU also provides financial support, currently about 6 million wonper month. In addition, we receive about 2 million won a month in membership dues. If we have any major events, the KCTU usually provides additional funding.

What about other civic organizations in Korea?

We have very good relations with Korean NGOs, including the JCMK, and also receive some financial assistance from these organizations. We are in constant touch with NGOs through an executive committee. We are also constantly involved in making solidarity with other organizations.

Any problems or difficulties in relationship with Korean organizations?

No, as I said, we have good relations with the Korean NGO community.

OTHER QUESTIONS

Other than Anwar, has the union or its members been targeted by immigration officials?

Beside Anwar, no other union member has been arrested by immigration authorities, although we are under constant surveillance--I know that I am watched by immigration authorities. This is one reason why living in Korea is so stressful for me.

What is the current condition and status of Anwar?

Anwar has been released from the detention facility because of ill health. Although, he is technically not free—supposedly, if he regains his health, he’ll be returned to detention—most likely, he will not be deported. Anwar’s health, though, is a serious problem. If he doesn’t recover soon, it is likely that he will not be reelected as president. Even in that event, he’ll continue to play an important role in the union as long as he is in Korea.

Is John Stossel Stupid? How a Lack of Good Comparison Makes for Shaky Analysis

May 5, 2006 • In his ABC report, Stupid in America: How a Lack of Choice Cheats Our Kids Out of a Good Education, John Stossel makes a compelling and purposely provocative case. His argument is encapsulated in the subtitle of his report: "How a lack of choice cheat our kids out of a good education." According to Stossel, the basic problem facing American schools is that they are insulated from competition. As he puts it, "American schools don't teach as well as schools in other countries because they are government monopolies, and monopolies don't have much incentive to compete." His reference to "other countries" is an important part of his argument. Indeed, much of his argument hinges on a type of comparative analysis, in which he ostensibly reveals the fundamental flaws of the American educational system through comparison with other cases. For example, to "prove" his basic claim, he focuses on Belgium, where the government forces schools to compete for students by funding students as opposed to schools. In other words, education money "follows" children to whatever school they decide to attend. It is, as Stossel is careful to point out, a kind of voucher system. Stossel peppers his report with a number of other international comparisons as well. He says, for instance, "The longer kids stay in American schools, the worse they do in international competition. They do worse than kids from poorer countries that spend much less money on education, ranking behind not only Belgium but also Poland, the Czech Republic and South Korea." Significantly, he implies, but does not explicitly state, that Poland, the Czech Republic and South Korea must also have schools systems premised on the same competitive principles that exist in Belgium. Indeed, based on Stossel's basic comparative argument, we should expect every country in the world that scores better than the U.S. to have a "competition-based" school system. We don't know, however, because Stossel doesn't tell us. His use of "facts" (and comparative cases) in other words, is extremely selective. Is he hiding something? Or is he simply too stupid to know that that sort of selective analysis is inherently flawed?

What happens when we examine some of these other countries or "cases" in a bit more depth? One country to consider is Finland, which, according to a 2004 study done by PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment), has the "best" school system in the world. So, does Finland have a "competition-based" system? Well, at least not based on Stossel's criteria. In fact, Finland has a "unified" school system, which sees children staying at the same school between the ages of seven and 16, rather than having primary and secondary schools. In other words, not only do schools not compete for students, but students are "stuck" in the same school 10 consecutive years. Interestingly, Finland also "spends more per elementary, middle- and high- school student than any other nation on Earth, and comes in second on spending for higher education. School lunches, health care, most class materials and university tuition are all free." Voilà! With just one additional case we have fatally undermined Stossel's contention that by their very nature any monopolistic, government-run school system is bad. We have also, with this single case, raised questions about the importance of money in education, which is another of Stossel's peeves.

Indeed, according to Stossel's report, money is largely irrelevant in determining educational quality. Not only does he belittle those who think money is important, but he suggests that there is plenty of emprical evidence and careful analysis to show this. As he explains it, "while many people say, 'We need to spend more money on our schools,' there actually isn't a link between spending and student achievement." Here, he's making a strong claim, asserting that there is no (causal) relationship between "spending" and "student achievement." His wording suggests that there are plenty of studies to back this up, but, not suprisingly, he doesn't cite any. However, he approvingly quotes Jay Greene, author of Education Myths, who asserts, "If money were the solution, the problem would already be solved....We've doubled per pupil spending, adjusting for inflation, over the last 30 years, and yet schools aren't better." True, but in keeping with Stossel's generally superficial (stupid?) analysis, there is no further discussion of why this is the case. Perhaps the problem is not money per se, but how the money is spent. Indeed, early on in his report, Stossel notes how one very successful charter school in Oakland, California uses its money to pay its teachers "more than what public school teachers earn." Hmm. Maybe if increased student spending went entirely to teachers, the problems of low student achievement would be solved in the United States? At least that is the implication of this "fact."

To be clear, however, I am not suggesting that higher salaries are a magic bullet; this almost certainly isn't the case. (How do I know? Because I checked teacher salaries, both nationally and internationally: Germany has the highest paid teachers in the world, but does not have the highest "student achievement.") Still, it is disingenuous, at best, to assert that just because state funding has increased that money is irrelevant to a quality education. A better, less "stupid" analysis would have examined in detail and depth the manner in which money is being spent by school districts today. Moreover, a comparative analysis of school spending in the US and other countries would also likely have shed light on the issue. By the way, teacher pay in Finland is relatively low, but this may ultimately hurt the education system since so many young teachers are leaving after only a few years.

It is important to emphasize that I am not making the case that "competition-based" schools systems are bad. That would be stupid. Rather, I am saying that the issue is far more complex than Stossel is willing to admit. Certainly, the simplest comparative analysis will tell us that ostensibly monopolized school systems are not destined to "cheat" children of a high quality education. Finland, in fact, is far from alone. So, what is the answer? I do not purport to have one, if only because I know I haven't done the research necessary to develop an adequate understanding of the issue. What I do know, however, is that anyone serious about the issue must avoid polemics and instead engage in serious analysis. And, one way to do "serious analysis" is to be much more careful about doing comparisons.

On this point, consider what Stossel could have done if he had looked at Belgium in more depth. In so doing, we will easily discover that there are a lot of differences between Belgium and the United States. One obvious difference is simply that Belgium has a population of only 10.3 million people, compared to almost 300 million in the United States. It is also an overwhelmingly Catholic country with two basic ethnic groups, the Flemish (58 percent) and the French-speaking Walloon (31 percent). Further analysis would show, moreover, that the educational performance of the Flemish and Walloon communities in Belgium are significantly different: while the mean scores on the math scale for the Flemish community were higher than those in the best-performing OECD countries, Finland and South Korea, the means scores for the French-speaking community were only "average" (relative to other OECD countries). It is also worth noting that, in Belgium, children can start mainstream nursery education at the age of 30-months. Very few countries in the world provide publicly financed education at such an early age (almost all children in the Flemish parts of Belgium receive nursery education). Perhaps early schooling is the key difference? In fact, identifying differences such as these are crucial.The reason is clear: each is a potential explanatory variable. That is, each could possibly explain why the school system in Belgium produces better-educated, "smarter" students. We cannot know for sure because a comparison of only two cases (i.e., the US and Belgium) suffers from the small-N problem ("smart" people know what this is). To determine which factors--or combination of factors--are important or essential to an explanation requires more cases and more systematic comparative analysis. This is hard, which might explain why Stossel didn't do this. Maybe he's not just stupid, but lazy.

Of course, I'm being facetious. Stossel isn't stupid and he isn't lazy (okay, maybe he's intellectually lazy). Clearly, though, he has an ax to grind. Unfortunately, as with many TV personalities (it's hard to call him a reporter), he's willing to make his case even if it means ignoring or, worse still, hiding important facts. Perhaps this is why he talked about Belgium rather than Finland, for the Finnish case didn't fit his view of the world. Apparently, he sees only the world he wants to see, and will use his considerable resources to ensure that the rest of the world sees the same thing. Fortunately, as a political scientist, I can easily identify poorly constructed, highly biased "analysis." Indeed, it is quite ironic that, while bemoaning the poor educational system in the United States, Stossel intentionally propagates ignorance through dumbed-down reporting. He doesn't really want a well-educated, critical and analytically adept American public; instead, he wants a public that is easily manipulated and conned by facile and glitzy analysis with a clumsily concealed political agenda. That's too bad.

Post Script. I think it is worth noting that I spent about 2~3 hours on this piece, including research. This means that all the information I cite is easily available to anyone with a computer. We have to assume that Stossel has a team of motivated researchers to help him on his stories (we should also assume that Stossel himself knows how to do basic research), which raises the question: why didn't Stossel find the same information? It's not hard to imagine why.

A Small Store in Paju, South Korea

The picture of this small store front in Paju city is unremarkable. However, it represents a significant and ongoing change in South Korea. For, it is a picture of store that caters, not to Korean customers, but to a range of foreign residents in Paju, a city of about 230,000. This is evident in the various national flags painted on the store's main sign. The flags represent China, Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, Indonesia and Singapore. On the left side of the store, moreover, are Chinese characters (called hanja in Korean) that read "Chinese grocercies." We can assume, then, that the main customers for this store come from at least a dozen countries outside of Korea. So what are all these people from across Asia doing in a small Korean town? Most, of course, are working there. They represent a wave of "low skilled" foreign workers that started coming to Korea in the late 1980s and is continuing to grow. Today, there are at least 420,000 foreign workers in Korea, and probably much more than that. This, however, is old news and not my main point. My main point is that the store represents a still unrecognized--and, for many Koreans, unwelcomed--phenomenon. Specifically, it represents the first inklings of permanent settlement in South Korea by culturally and ethnically distinct "minority groups." Koreans have long defined their society as ethnically pure and homogenous, and while this claim has always been subject to some debate, it is unarguably part of the Korean psyche. Indeed, many (but certainly not all) Koreans, while accepting of temporary migration, particularly if it serves the interests of the Korean economy, are profoundly opposed to "immigration"--the long-term or permanent settlement of "outsiders" within Korea. Even more, many Koreans firmly and unquestioningly believe that Korea can avoid becoming a "country of immigration."

Whether or not Korea can avoid becoming a country of immigration is open to debate: to a certain extent only time will tell. It is important to understand, however, that Korea is not unique: other countries have also resisted immigration, but ultimately such resistance proved futile. There are a number of complex reasons for this, one of the most important of which, perhaps, is that denial of permanent settlement generally requires the use of coercion and extreme measures. Among democracies, however, the use of coercion and extreme measures is almost necessarily limited by institutional practices and norms that protect individual rights, including the rights of "non-citizens." Democracies, as well, have legal and constitutional frameworks that allows individuals to challenge effectively unjust treatment by both governmental organs and society at-large.

Korea, of course, is a democracy, even if an imperfect one. Therefore, simply forcing people to leave--people who have lived in Korea for many years, sometimes decades; people who have married and had children; people who have few economic options outside of Korea; and people who have contributed mightily to Korean society through their work and self-sacrifice--will not be an easy thing to do. Nor will it be humane. Almost assuredly, then, Korea will become a de facto country of immigration. It is better, I believe, to recognize this earlier rather than later. It is better to implement sound, rational, and socially just policies now so that future problems can be avoided or at least mitigated.

The picture of the World Food store tells us that "foreign workers" are beginning to grow roots in Korean soil. They are creating communities. They are becoming part of Korean society. It is time for the country to take heed of this change.